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COMMENTARY
TWO FALLACIES ABOUT DNA DATA BANKS
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT*
David H. Kayet
INTRODUCTION
As J.P. was entering her townhouse on a chilly
Minnesota morning, a man grabbed her, held a metal object
against her neck, forced her into her car, and pulled a stocking
cap over her face. He threatened her with a screwdriver and
raped her. Troy Bradley Bloom was out of prison after serving
nine years for a series of sexual assaults in Minneapolis. His
DNA profile was in Minnesota's sexual offender DNA data
base. A computerized search revealed that the sample of
Bloom's DNA on file matched semen stains found in the car.
Bloom was arrested and convicted of burglary, kidnapping, and
criminal sexual conduct. "Without the database," the
prosecutor reported, "there is no way he would have been
convicted."1
Late for school, a seven-year-old girl was hurrying along
Milwaukee's South 18th Street, going as quickly as she could
* @2001 David H. Kaye. All Rights Reserved.
f Regents' Professor, Arizona State University, Fellow, Center for the Study of
Law, Science, and Technology. I am grateful to Edward Imwinkelried and Michael
Smith for contributions to portions of this comment and to John Butler and George
Sensabaugh for information on the CODIS core STR loci.
' David Chanen, Court of Appeals Upholds '94 Rape Conviction That Used
DNA Analysis, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 1, 1996, at 3B (quoting
Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Steve Redding).
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in her puffy snowsuit. A man appeared suddenly, wrapped his
hand around her right wrist and pulled her behind a house. He
raped her. Six years later, just before Wisconsin's statute of
limitations for sexual assault was about to run, an arrest
warrant was issued for "John Doe, unknown male, with
matching deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") at genetic locations
D2S44, D4S139, D5S110, D10S28, D1S7 and D17S79." The
unknown male is still at large, but Norm Gahn, the prosecutor
who initiated the practice of issuing "John Doe" DNA warrants,
observed that "[s]omeday, somewhere, we hope this guy comes
up in somebody's databank. And we'll nail him."
2
When law enforcement authorities began building DNA
data bases in the early 1990s, only people like Bloom who were
convicted of serious sexual crimes were included. Before long,
many states began collecting DNA from murderers, then other
violent felons, and, most recently, all felons and even some
misdemeanants. Extensions of the data bases followed from the
realization that DNA evidence is more common at crime scenes
than was at first thought and that recidivism rates for many
3felonies are at least as large as those for most sex crimes.
Britain has assembled a large data base by taking DNA
samples at the time of an arrest. Not only did the DNA profiles
of arrested property offenders often yield data base "hits" in
rape cases, but the growing data base produced even more
"hits" in burglaries and vehicle thefts.4 Bills expanding data
2 Eric Slater, Rape Case DNA Tests the Limits, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 11,
2000, at Al.
3 For example, The Bureau of Justice Statistics examined the arrest and
conviction records of a representative sample of all prisoners released in 1983 from
prisons in eleven states. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 26
(1997). The rates of re-arrests and re-convictions for rapists were 52% and 36%,
respectively. For all violent offenders, the rates were still higher-60% and 42%,
respectively. Id. at 27; see also Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational
Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 578-80 (1997); Thomas
J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex
Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 149, 154-55 (1993); Paul R. Rice, The Evidence
Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence with Supporting
Commentary, 171 F.R.D. 330, 479 (1997). However, these data do not exclude the
possibility that even if sex offenders are not distinctive in terms of the overall
proportion of recidivists, they commit a relatively large number of sex offenses per
recidivist in the follow-up period. See Amitai Etzioni, Address at Conference on DNA
and the Criminal Justice System, Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 21, 2000.
4 See David Werrett, The Strategic Use of DNA Profiling, Address to the 18th
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bases to include arrestee profiles are pending in several states.5
Louisiana already has legislation authorizing it.' California
law provides for DNA records to be kept in the state's data
base while charges are pending, and a Texas statute requires
the collection of DNA specimens from everyone indicted for
certain felonies, including kidnapping and sexual assault.'
Each DNA data base expansion has triggered sharp
debate. Law enforcement officials often view DNA sampling as
no more problematic than fingerprinting. Civil liberties
advocates and other commentators decry "unfettered
government-sponsored bioinvasion"9 and worry that DNA data
International Congress on Forensic Haemogenetics, San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 19,
1999); see also Paul Ferrara, DNA Typing in Action: Databasing in the Commonwealth
of Virginia, PROFILES IN DNA, June 1999, at 2, 4 ("greater than sixty percent of the
hits from violent offender cases match database samples from convicted burglars-not
violent offenders").
6 A bill introduced early in 1999, in the Connecticut General Assembly would
require the collection of DNA from those arrested of any criminal offense. The bill does
not require destruction of the sample unless the arrestee is not later "convicted of an
offense." S.B. 315, 1999 Leg., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 1999). A bill introduced in the North
Carolina General Assembly would require that DNA samples be taken from all
individuals arrested for various felonies. S.B. 95, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2001). Section 6 of the bill would allow individuals to petition for expungement of a
"DNA record or profile" after "the felony arrest or conviction.., has been reversed and
the case dismissed." Id. New York Senate Bill 1795, introduced January 30, 2001,
would require individuals arrested for a variety of felonies to provide a sample of blood
for DNA testing, cf. N.Y.A. 4486 § 2, 2001 Leg. Sess. (2001) (providing that the
executive branch develop "a statewide strategic plan for requiring any person arrested
for an offense for which the fingerprints of the person are required to be taken... also
be required to provide at the time of arrest, a sample appropriate for DNA testing to
determine identification characteristics specific to such person for inclusion in the state
DNA identification index").
6 See 15 LA. REV. STAT. § 609(A) (West 1999) ("A person who is arrested for a
felony sex offense or other specified offense on or after September 1, 1999, shall have a
DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is fingerprinted pursuant to the
booking procedure."). Despite the language of the statute, it was reported that the state
will delay implementing the requirement for lack of funding and testing facilities. See
Guy Gugliotta, A Rush to DNA Sampling; Vital Police Tool? Affront to Liberty? Both?,
WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 17012783.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 297(b)(3) (West 2001) ("For the purposes of this
subdivision, 'a suspec? means a person against whom an information or indictment has
been filed for one of the crimes listed in subdivision (a) of Section 296. For the purposes
of this subdivision, a person shall remain a suspect for two years from the date of the
filing of the information or indictment or until the DNA laboratory receives notification
that the person has been acquitted of the charges or the charges were dismissed.").
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (effective Sept. 1, 2001).
Paul R. Billings, Editorial, DNA Data Banks Would Taint Justice, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1999, 1999 WL 6043488.
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banks will expose "[wiho I am, my biological potential, my
health situation, my paternity, my race, [and the] most
profound personal secrets.""0 The more extreme critics even
depict the data base statutes as countenancing medical
experimentation on unconsenting human subjects in violation
of the Nuremberg Code and basic ethical principles."
In Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of
Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, Professors Mark A.
Rothstein and Sandra Carnahan seek a safe course through
this sea of rhetoric. 2 They presume that "DNA data banks of
increasingly broad scope would help to solve more crimes," 3
and they are not prepared to dismiss out-of-hand these data
bases as unconstitutional." Nevertheless, they insist that
"public policy demands" that only a small fraction of the
population-convicted sex offenders and violent felons-have
identifying DNA types on file, that the types consist strictly of
noncoding DNA regions, and that the samples themselves be
destroyed.15 These policy conclusions are presented as part of a
larger list of nine commandments for law enforcement DNA
data bases that would restrain the government in its use of
genetic information. 6
10 60 Minutes: DNA Data Banks Keep Track of Criminals, Cause Controversy
(CBS television broadcast, Apr. 18, 1999), available at 1999 WL 16209028 (statement
of Professor Nadine Strossen, ACLU President); see also Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1, 11
(Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1999) (dissenting opinion) ("DNA samples will reveal everything
about a person"). For criticism of such "genetic essentialism," see David H. Kaye, The
Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y -
(forthcoming 2001).
11 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Institute for Science, Law and Technology, Illinois
Institute of Technology at 30, Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass.
1999); cf. Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in
Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 212 & 215 (2000) (asserting
that research uses of anonymized DNA data or samples taken without consent are
ethically suspect). For a skeptical analysis of such assertions, see David H. Kaye,
Bioethics, Bench, and Bar: Selected Arguments in Landry v. Attorney General, 40
JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2000).
12 Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in
Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127
(2001) [hereinafter Legal and Policy Issues].
13 Id. at 129 (footnote omitted).
14 See infra Part III.
5 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 130.
16 Most of the nine commandments are unexceptional, but some seem
arbitrary. For example, Rothstein and Carnahan urge that only buccal swabs be used
to collect DNA even though they recognize that less intrusive procedures for sampling
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The objective is commendable, and, at first blush, the
limitations seem eminently reasonable. However, there is little
reason to restrict the data bases to profiles based only on loci in
noncoding regions or to confine them to identifying profiles of
only sexual offenders and violent felons. If anything, a highly
secure population-wide data base of purely identifying
information might well offer the best accommodation of the
public and private interests in crime control and civil rights
and liberties. But one need not go that far to see the fallacies
or weaknesses in the Rothstein-Carnahan commandments.
Part I of this Commentary explains why confining forensic loci
to noncoding regions is neither necessary nor sufficient to
protect privacy. It proposes a different standard-limiting
identification profiles to loci that are not associated with any
stigmatizing or socially meaningful phenotypes-that is better
tailored to genuine privacy concerns. Part II shows that
limiting the coverage of the data bases to sexual offenses and
violent felonies would be unduly restrictive. It argues that
while more research is needed if the data base laws are to
select those crimes that are the most appropriate to trigger
collection of DNA, there are clear indications that limiting
coverage to violent felons significantly compromises the power
DNA are becoming available. Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 161. They
propose that "the data banks ... not be used for ... research," but they do not define
the types of research that they fear or indicate why this research is objectionable
beyond the oversimplification that "government funded or sponsored research
involving human subjects requires voluntary, informed consent." Id. at 164. No law or
regulation requires informed consent in every circumstance, and it is well known that
"[tihe role of informed consent has been much less clear for research that does not
require such personal involvement but rather can be performed using tissue samples."
Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue
Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1786 (1995). Indeed, "[w]hether previously collected human
biological materials may be used for newly conceived research has been the most
controversial issue in research ethics for the past four years." Henry T. Greely,
Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research
Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737,
737 (1999). Subtleties in applying the so-called "Common Rule" for human subjects
research expressed in the 'Code of Federal Regulations to convicted offender DNA
samples are discussed in NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE,
28-32 (1999), and Kaye, supra note 11, at 213-14.17 See David H. Kaye & Michael Smith, DNA Databases for Law Enforcement:
The Coverage Question and the Case for a Population-wide Database, in THE
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE: THE USE OF DNA IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (David
Lazer ed., forthcoming).
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of the data bases to identify perpetrators of both violent and
nonviolent crimes and to deter criminal misconduct. Part III
moves from these policy issues to the Fourth Amendment
question. As Legal and Policy Issues indicates, the opinions of
the Supreme Court this Term in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond 8 and Ferguson v. City of Charleston19 undermine
many lower court opinions holding that convicted-offender
DNA data bases satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Consequently,
I outline a theory that should permit carefully designed and
administered identification data bases, including some that
incorporate profiles from individuals other than convicted
violent offenders, to pass constitutional muster.
I. THE FALLACY OF NONCODING REGIONS
Rothstein and Carnahan's discussion of their third
commandment-to avoid coding DNA2 -consists of essentially
four sentences. First, they cite the "commonly raised objections
• . . that samples could be analyzed to reveal future health
risks and that this information might be disclosed to . . .
insurers and employers."2' They do not discuss how realistic it
is to imagine that insurers and employers will turn to the
police to obtain DNA samples before insuring or hiring ex-
convicts .22 They do not mention that there are no known
instances of such disclosure ever having occurred, that there
are relatively few documented instances of insurers or
employers using anyone's surreptitiously obtained DNA
samples,23 and that there are a plethora of laws against
"genetic discrimination.2 4
's 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
19 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
20 Rothstein arid Carnahan define "the coding regions" to consist solely of
exons. Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 162 n.208. An exon is "any segment of
an interrupted gene that is represented in the mature RNA product." BENJAMIN
LEWIN, GENES VI 1223 (1997).
21 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 158 (footnotes omitted).
22 The concern is somewhat more powerful with respect to a population-wide
repository of samples, but commandment three would apply regardless of coverage.
See David H. Kaye, Respecting Genetic Privacy: A Foreword, 40 JURIMETRICS
J. 1, 6 n.26 (1999).
24 See, e.g., William F. Mulholland, II & Ami S. Jaeger, Comment, Genetic
Privacy and Discrimination: A Survey of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317
[Vol. 67: 1
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Indeed, Rothstein and Carnahan admit that their
concern lies more with public perception, even if unfounded,
than with any genuine threat to personal privacy.' Yet, it is
not clear that the public objects to the use of certain coding
regions. Fingerprints, for instance, have a genetic component,26
but the public is comfortable with this identification
technology; there is no broad public demand for legislation to
limit the government to collecting or storing data on only the
nongenetic features of fingerprints. Ironically, commentators
who insist that genetic information is particularly dangerous
and demands special attention to protect privacy feed the
public malaise with genetic technology, prompting even
scholars like Professor Rothstein, who reject genetic
exceptionalism, 27 to try to justify legislation on the basis of
intuitions about what the public wants rather than what would
best serve the public.
This is not to say that public acceptability can or should
be excluded from the legislative process. Politics, after all, is
the art of the possible, but scholarship seeking to devise the
best possible public policies should begin by examining the
extent to which the suspected objections of the public are
justified and should consider the possibility of educating the
public rather than immediately capitulating to
misunderstandings of science and its true privacy implications.
Second, Rothstein and Carnahan cite the less common
objection that "the information could be used for research into
purported genetic links to criminality."28 They do not assess the
merit or plausibility of this objection, and it is doubtful that
many geneticists believe that there are "crime genes" waiting
to be discovered. Moreover, other than suggesting that the
public does not like such research, they do not explain why-if
it were scientifically valid-research in behavioral genetics
should be shunned. One might think that the law should
(1999); Helen R. Davis & Janis V. Mitrius, Note, Recent Legislation on Genetics and
Insurance, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 69 (1996).
2See Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 159 n.200.
2See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 117 (2001).
27 See Mark A. Rothstein, Why Treating Genetic Information Separately is
a Bad Idea, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 33 (1999).
2Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 158 (footnotes omitted).
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encourage rather than frustrate a better understanding of
human behavior,29 but Rothstein and Carnahan would forbid
all research undertaken with samples or data initially acquired
for law enforcement purposes. Their ban would apply no
matter how innocuous the research and no matter what
procedures are followed to render samples or data anonymous,
or to obtain consent from individuals whose profiles are
stored.3 o
Third, Rothstein and Carnahan worry "that the
information could be used for child support or immigration
purposes."31 Are they concerned that a convicted offender who
is named in a paternity suit (and hence subject to a court order
to provide a DNA sample for parentage testing) will not have to
provide a second sample because the first already is in a data
bank and could be made available to the court? That a child of
disputed parentage seeking to obtain citizenship could turn to
an offender data bank to demonstrate that his father or mother
is a U.S. citizen? If these are meaningful invasions of parental
privacy-which I doubt 3 -- the obvious solution is to prohibit
the disclosure of these samples or records even when a court
would be willing to order a physical examination in the
interests of civil justice.
Rothstein and Carnahan apparently find these and
other unspecified "related concerns about improper uses of
DNA samples"33 compelling, for the fourth step in their
argument is the observation that these concerns "would be
eliminated if only noncoding regions of DNA were analyzed and
the samples were destroyed after analysis."34 However, this
29 Cf. Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections
Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 207 (2001).
30 Relying on Kimmelman, supra note 11, at 212, they report that "[tiwenty
states permit the use of samples for research." Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12,
at 164 n.216. However, "twenty states" does not refer to all research uses, and it does
not refer to samples. Rather, Kimmelman reports that "twenty states ... authorize use
of databanks for research on forensic techniques." Kimmelman, supra note 11, at 212
(emphasis added). Of the twenty states, it seems that fifteen only "allow release of
records," and not samples. Id. The remaining five "appear to authorize release of DNA
samples," but only for "identification research and protocol development." Id.
31 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 158-59 (footnote omitted).
32 See Kaye, supra note 11.
Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 159.
Id. Of course, the same thing could be said about the hundreds of millions of
DNA samples kept in public or private repositories. See NATIONAL BIOETHIcs
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sanguine conclusion rests on the mistaken assumption that
only the portions of genes that code for proteins or ribo-nucleic
acid ("RNA") reveal information that an individual might have
a right to keep secret. The fact is that some noncoding loci can
indicate or predict disease states,35 and all loci, coding and
noncoding alike, can be used for parentage testing.36
Thus, the noncoding commandment is not entirely
satisfactory. Still, the desire to limit the government to
portions of the genome whose revelation would not harm any
meaningful individual interest (other than avoiding
identification) is appropriate-and that is precisely the
principle that Rothstein and Carnahan should embrace. It
serves no clear purpose to bar access to loci that are not
indicative of features of some social concern. Blood groups and
serum proteins, for example, have long been used in forensic
serology. Typing the loci that govern these phenotypes poses no
new privacy issue and need not be banned." The public has not
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 13 (estimating that there were more than
282 million specimens of human biological materials stored in the United States in
1988, with samples from another twenty million individuals accumulating each year).
The real issue is whether less drastic remedies would satisfy valid concerns about
undesirable disclosures or uses of samples.
A DNA sequence that is adjacent to an exon in which disease-producing
alleles are common could be indicative or predictive of the disease. See Kaye, supra
note 11, at 201. For example, a condition known as G6PD deficiency causes anemia in
400 million people. Two of its many variants (the Med and A- variants) are strongly
associated with certain microsatellites in the noncoding region of the G6PD gene. See
Ann Gibbons, Studying Humans-and Their Cousins and Parasites, 292 SC. 627, 628
(2001).
" Consequently, citing fears about the use of offender DNA samples or records
for "child support or immigration purposes" as a reason to preclude coding loci makes
no sense. All alleles inherited in a Mendelian fashion (including the noncoding STRs
now used for offender databases) can be used for these purposes. See, e.g., R.L. Alford
et al., Rapid and Efficient Resolution of Parentage by Amplification of Short Tandem
Repeats, 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 190 (1994); see generally Jeffrey W. Morris & David
W. Gjertson, The Scientific Status of Parentage Testing, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 19.2 & 19.3 (David
Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
37 Rothstein and Carnahan contend that the overinclusiveness is not harmful
because there are ample loci in noncoding regions, and the commandment to stay away
from coding loci is costless. Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 159 n.200. But
this rejoinder ignores their own assertion that one of the 13 CODIS STR loci is coding.
Id. at 159 n.199. If this were so, then at a minimum, every federal, state, and local
database would have to be redesigned to conform to the proposed no-coding directive.
This would result either in a loss of statistical power to distinguish among individuals
(if the offending STR data were purged) or retesting of hundreds of thousands of
2001]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
questioned the use of coding regions in forensic work, and
public support of or opposition to offender data bases will not
be substantially affected by the assurance that only noncoding
loci-as opposed to coding loci that are as meaningless as
fingerprints-will be used .
Conversely, noncoding sequences that actually predict
certain disease states should not be used in forensic data base
work. Thus far, this is exactly what has occurred. The thirteen
standard identifying loci used in the FBI's Convicted Offender
DNA Index System ("CODIS") represent perhaps a millionth of
the human genome. Contrary to the assertion in Legal and
Policy Issues, all are noncoding, and none is known to correlate
with any observable traits-stigmatizing or otherwise.39 A
samples (to include additional loci). Furthermore, the argument cannot be reconciled
with the claim that "additional research is likely to reveal both the functional and
evolutionary significance of all human DNA." Id. at 162 n.208. If and when previously
unknown functions for all DNA are identified, the bright line distinction between
coding and noncoding regions will become meaningless.
However, it seems extremely improbable that all human DNA is functional,
and most of it is not functional in any sense that meaningfully implicates personal
privacy. See, e.g., LEWIN, supra note 20, at 703 (describing pseudogenes); Bob Kuska,
Should Scientists Scrap the Notion of Junk DNA?, 90 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1032
(1998); Wojciech Makalowski, Genomic Scrap Yard: How Genomes Utilize All That
Junk, 259 GENE 61 (2000). For example, some research indicates that certain
repetitive, noncoding sequences play a crucial role in the process by which one of the
two X chromosomes in a female is inactivated early in development. See Gretchen
Vogel, Objection #2: Why Sequence the Junk?, 291 SCI. 1194 (2001). Suppose that this
inactivation is essential to the development of a viable fetus but that there are many
nonlethal sequence variants in the female population. The loci would be "functional"-
they are necessary for proper development-but the polymorphisms in the population
would not be.
38 Rothstein and Carnahan present the statement of two FBI scientists that
"[tihe majority of genetic markers used in DNA typing are noncoding segments" as if it
somehow "endorsed" the exclusive "use of noncoding regions." Legal and Policy Issues,
supra note 12, at 162 (citation omitted). These individuals do not endorse such a rule.
Rather, they insist that the use of some coding loci in forensic work is not a problem
because "the relative risk of the association is so low as to provide little or no
information regarding an individual's health status or future well-being, the DNA
types from coding marker data do not provide the level of information as, for example,
the disease-causing gene itself." Randall S. Murch & Bruce Budowle, Are Developments
in Forensic Applications of DNA Technology Consistent with Privacy Protections?, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA
212, 224 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
3" See Kaye, supra note 11, at 201. Citing JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA
TYPING: BIOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY BEHIND STR MARKERS (2001), Rothstein and
Carnahan assert that the CSF1PO microsatellite lies in a coding region. See Legal and
Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 159 nn.199-200. Perhaps they misinterpreted the
statement that "CSF1PO is a simple tetranuceotide repeat found in the c-fms proto-
[Vol. 67: 1
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statutory proscription of coding loci would not be a disaster.
But it is a second-best solution to a nonproblem. At best, it
would offer the public a false sense of security. A standard
aimed directly at the potential threat to personal privacy is a
better means of protecting privacy.
II. THE FALLACY OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS AND VIOLENT
FELONS
Rothstein and Carnahan's eighth commandment is that
"DNA data banks should be limited to DNA obtained from
individuals convicted of violent sex offenses and other violent
felonies."' This commandment incorporates two ideas: that
only convicted offenders should have their identifying DNA
profiles on file and that the only offenses that warrant
collection of samples are violent felonies. Neither proposition is
well defended. To determine the optimal scope of a data base,
one would need to consider the favorable impact of the system
on crime and law enforcement costs (the benefits) and the
expenses of constructing and operating the system as well as
the expected harms to individuals (the costs).41
Although Rothstein and Carnahan speak of the need to
balance costs and benefits,4 2 they do very little balancing. They
write that although it is "reasonable" to believe that "[tihe
more samples in the data bank, the greater the likelihood of a
match[,] .... there is little empirical evidence."43 However, all
the available evidence suggests that a significant fraction of
oncogene for the CSF-1 receptor on the long arm of chromosome 5." BUTLER, supra, at
70. This description means that CSF1PO is a short segment of DNA (a "microsatellite)
consisting of repetitions of the sequence AGAT. See id. at 274. The shortest allele has
six repeats (AGATAGATAGATAGATAGATAGAT); the longest has sixteen repeats. Id.
Such DNA variations are known as Short Tandem Repeats ("STRes"). Like four other
STRs selected for use in CODIS, this one is located within a gene. But it lies within an
intron, not an exon. Thus, as Butler clearly states, all "the 13 CODIS core STR loci are
in noncoding regions. .. ." Id. at 245.
40 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 165.
41 1 do not mean to restrict "costs" to monetary matters. A violation of rights or
individual interests that deserve protection counts as a cost.42 See Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 161 (quoting Jean E. McEwen,
DNA Data Banks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN
THE GENETIC ERA 231, 236 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997)).43 Id. at 158 (footnote omitted).
20011
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sexual offenders have committed nonviolent offenses.44
Consequently, even if sex offenses were the only crimes for
which DNA evidence is useful, failing to include all other types
of convicted offenders drastically reduces the efficacy of the
data bases." In addition, innovations in technology permit
DNA evidence to assist in solving burglaries, auto thefts, and
other crimes that once were thought not to yield traces of DNA.
Entering homes, apartments, or cars to steal property often is
repeated many times before an initial apprehension. While
such property crimes generate DNA traces in a smaller fraction
of the cases, they are so much more common than violent
felonies that they have proved to be a rich source of "cold
hits." 6 This is clear even though no jurisdiction has exploited
the full potential of DNA data bases to resolve nonviolent
crimes.
" Studies show that convicted rapists released from prison are more likely to
be re-arrested for crimes other than rape than they are for another rape. The Bureau of
Justice Statistics examined the arrest records of a representative sample of all
prisoners released in 1983 from prisons in eleven states. See LAWRENCE A.
GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 26 (1997). During the three-year follow-up period,
7.7% of the 2,214 released rapists were re-arrested for another rape, but over five times
this number (42.8%) were re-arrested on other charges. Id. The rapists' re-arrest rates
for other violent crimes were 2.8% for murder, 8.5% for robbery, and 10.7% for assault;
the remaining 22.8% of the re-arrests were for nonviolent crimes. (The percentages
relate to a base of 2,214 rapists who were studied.). Id. Apparently, rapists do not
confine their criminal activities to rape and other violent offenses.
45 See, e.g., Richard Willing, Study: Many Rapists Were Thieves First Results
May Lead to Taking DNA for Lesser Crimes, USA TODAY, July 10, 2000, available at
2000 WL 5783383; Barbara Bradley, Profile: Use of a DNA Data Bank to Catch
Criminals in Virginia, NAT'L PUBLIC RADIO, MORNING EDITION, Mar. 8, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 9326731 (citing Paul Ferrara, the director of Virginia's Department of
Forensic Science, as reporting that more than half the rapists caught in database
searches were already in the data bank, not for sexual assault, but for burglary); Legal
and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 158 n.195 (acknowledging that "52% of Florida
offenders linked to sexual assaults and homicides by DNA data base matches had prior
burglary convictions, a non-violent offense.").
"' A "cold hit" is a match between a DNA profile derived from trace evidence
and an exhaustive search of a database of profiles. By 1999, the United Kingdom's
Forensic Science Service was able to develop a DNA profile in five percent of all
property-crime samples, and most of the hits in the database for England and Wales
now come from burglary and vehicle theft cases rather than from rapes or murders. See
Werrett, supra note 4; see also Forensics Help Trap 1,000 Car Thieves, BRISTOL
EVENING POST, June 27, 2001, at 7, available at 2001 WL 22486231. Likewise, 77% of
reported data base matches in New Zealand "have originated from burglaries." S.A.
Harbison et al., The New Zealand DNA Databank: Its Development and Significance as
a Crime Solving Tool, 41 SCI. & JUST. 33, 36 (2001).
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In sum, there is plenty of empirical evidence that bigger
data bases solve more crimes.47 Perhaps the clearest proof
comes from the United Kingdom, where police take DNA
profiles from all persons arrested for imprisonable offenses.
Authorities there report a forty percent hit rate-four out of
ten new crime scene samples checked against the data base
match a previously recorded profile of an offender or suspect."
It seems likely that limiting DNA data babes to violent
felonies, as Rothstein and Carnahan propose, would severely
compromise the power of these data bases to prevent crimes.49
And for what?
Surprisingly, Rothstein and Carnahan do not identify a
single harm that would flow from including more felonies as
qualifying offenses in a data base of purely identifying
profiles."0 They do attempt to address a problem with
expanding coverage outside the realm of convicted offenders,
but that problem is remarkably amorphous or, to use their
47 In the same breath that Rothstein and Carnahan dismiss the evidence on
the value of including profiles from individuals convicted of nonviolent felonies in DNA
databases, they note that in Virginia, "85% of hits would have been missed if [as they
propose] the data bank were limited only to violent offenders." Legal and Policy Issues,
supra note 12, at 158 n.195. Even so, they would be correct to complain that such
studies are "limited" in the sense that they have been presented to the media and at
professional meetings, but not, to my knowledge, in the peer-reviewed criminology
literature. Moreover, statistics like those in Florida are hardly conclusive. The yield
that follows from including the profiles of burglars depends on: (1) how many
burglaries occur, and (2) how well an initial burglary predicts subsequent crimes (of all
types) that might be solved with the aid of DNA evidence.
48 Forensic Science Service, Press Release: Crime Reduction Model, July 14,
1999, available at http:/lwww.forensic.gov.uklforensicnews/pressjreleases/1999/007-
.htm.
49 As criminals become more careful about leaving DNA traces, the databases
could become less effective. See Richard Willing, Criminals Try to Outwit DNA, USA
TODAY, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al. At this point, however, it seems premature to maintain
that no state should experiment with (and carefully analyze the results of)
incorporating in their databases profiles from at least some nonviolent felonies. Cf
Press Release, Serial Burglar Caught by Pioneering Science, http:/vww.-
forensic.gov.uklforensic/newspress_release/2001/04-05-2001.htm (last visited July 13,
2001 (reporting that an experimental project to detect nonviolent offenders led to the
conviction of a burglar implicated in forty-three burglaries using a "DNA Low Copy
Number" method and "local intelligence databases").
s A "purely identifying database" is one that uses loci of the type described in
Part I and that effectively prevents unauthorized access to the original samples. The
latter protection could be achieved by destroying samples, as advocafed in Legal and
Policy Issues, or by insulating police from the collection, analysis, and storage of
samples, as discussed in Kaye & Smith, supra note 17.
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term, "abstract."51 They assert that that biometric information
trespasses into "a sphere of inviolability," disrupting
"autonomy, dignity, and physical integrity";52 that " '[tihe
quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the
methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law;' " that
" '[tihe greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding;' "" and that we should abjure comprehensive
data bases for the same reasons we abhor coerced confessions.
5
Conspicuously absent from these ringing phrases and
strained analogies is a clear and convincing statement of the
liberty or dignitary interests being threatened. It surely is not
bodily integrity or freedom of movement. It would be easy (at
least prospectively) to extract identification profiles as an
adjunct to public health programs that screen DNA samples
from almost all newborns, looking for treatable genetic
diseases.56 The identification profiles could be transmitted to a
single, secure, national, law enforcement data base. Unlike the
offender data bases favored by Rothstein and Carnahan, in
slowly assembling a population-wide data base, law
enforcement agencies would not need-and should not be
permitted-to handle, much less retain, the samples. Such a
system would entail no further detention of the individual or
invasion of the body. Neither is there any danger to the privacy
of personally sensitive information. The data base profiles are
and can continue to be limited to markers of purely biometric
significance, represented in the data base records as a series of
digits comparable to social security or passport numbers.
What, then, is the offensive feature of this law enforcement
procedure that makes it one of the "greatest threats to liberty"?
No answer is to be found in Legal and Policy Issues. The
closest the article comes is an unexplored analogy to the
practice of wiretapping. 7 According to Rothstein and
51 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 166.
52 Id. at 167.
5Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
54 Id. at 169 (citation omitted).
55 Id.
SG See Phil Reilly, Legal and Public Policy Issues in DNA Forensics, 2 NATURE
REVIEWS GENETIcs 313, 315 (2001).
57 Rothstein and Carnahan note that in 1943, the Senate did not act on a bill to
establish a national fingerprinting system. Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at
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Carnahan, the 1928 case of "Olmstead v. United States raises
issues analogous to those we see today with DNA law
enforcement data banks."8 But which issues are these? In
Olmstead, the Court held, over Justice Brandeis's celebrated
dissent, that wiretapping did not infringe the Fourth
Amendment unless it entailed a physical trespass to private
property. The unfettered ability of the police to listen to any
conversation at any time in any place would greatly undermine
any sense of confidentiality and security in private
communications. In that context, Justice Brandeis's
admonitions against insidious and overzealous steps toward a
totalitarian regime are not merely stirring, but persuasive. But
suitably designed DNA data bases do not interfere with
personal communications, do not track a person's movements
day and night, and (with the possible exception of genetic
relatedness) do not reveal personally or socially sensitive
qualities. Even a population-wide national data base would not
resemble universal electronic surveillance.
It is not privacy in general that is put at risk when the
state has an ability to match found DNA with a profile retained
in an identification data base. It is not autonomy. It is not
human dignity. It is the interest in disguising or altering one's
identity.9 There is a largely unspoken assumption, deeply
rooted in American history and culture, that if we are moved to
do so, it is possible for us to leave the past behind and to re-
invent ourselves in another place. But this a romantic,
unrealistic prospect today. The lives we lead leave a trail in
medical records, in credit card records, in school records, in
employment files-in any records that link to our social
security numbers, drivers' license numbers, and the like. We
can be found if the state, or anyone with means, really cares to
find us.
160 n.204. Earlier efforts also were unsuccessful. See Bills in Congress re
Fingerprinting, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 656 (1942).
'Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 168 (citation omtted).
9 1 am grateful to Michael Smith for framing the issue in this way, and this
paragraph and the next borrows liberally text he prepared for Kaye & Smith, supra
note 17.
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We may resist acknowledging that anonymity is no
longer feasible, and we may be tempted to portray it as a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution." But the
interest in changing or obscuring one's identity is not a
constitutionally recognized or morally profound interest. It
may be desired by' many people intent on committing crimes;
surely, it is a rare offender who expects to be identified and
apprehended when he or she commits a crime. If no one knows
who they are, these offenders may well elude apprehension;
conversely, there is no special trick to apprehending a burglar,
a robber, or a hit-and-run driver whose name can be given to
police by a passerby. A comprehensive DNA identification data
base reduces such anonymity for offenders-and for the rest of
us. Still, it seems that anonymity and the opportunity to take
on a new identity is of little practical importance unless we
want to commit crimes. If so, those who would oppose a
comprehensive identification data base simply to honor the
desire for an unstable identity are left in the awkward position
of opposing a program that protects everyone from the most
serious threats to their lives and well-being for the stated
reason that its existence would make it harder to pursue a life
of crime."
In urging the narrowest plausible scope for DNA data
bases, Legal and Policy Issues also ignores an issue of supreme
importance in the design of law enforcement data bases.
Because most convicted felons (and most arrestees) are
minority citizens,62 including individuals on the basis of
conviction (or arrest) generates a racially skewed collection of
DNA profiles. In some states, one in seven African-American
males are incarcerated before the age of eighteen, compared
GO bviously, I am speaking of anonymity as to one's identity in general.
Anonymity may be personally or socially valuable in certain contexts, such as making
charitable donations or expressing unpopular opinions. A population-wide DNA
database for law enforcement purposes would not be a serious threat to maintaining
anonymity in these situations.
'; Of course, the future could bring laws we think it right to violate, even a
state that deserves to be overthrown. There is no denying that a comprehensive DNA
identification database would reduce the anonymity essential for successful
revolutionaries.
62 In 2000, there were some 663,700 white inmates of prisons and jails
compared to 791,600 African-Americans and 290,000 Hispanic-Americans. ALLEN J.
BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 5, tbl.
12 (2001).
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with 1 in 125 white males.63 Nationally, the percentage of adult
black men under correctional supervision of one kind or
another is four times higher tham the corresponding percentage
of white men.'
Creating a hodgepodge of DNA data bases on the basis
of contacts with police, prosecutors and judges is sure to
compound the racial polarization of our criminal justice
system, while foregoing the deterrent and investigative
capability that a population-wide data base would afford. Any
effective data base will lead to increased rates of detection and
conviction for the individuals whose DNA types are on file.
See Heidi M. Hsia & Donna Hamparian, Disproportionate Minority
Confinement: 1997 Update, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 1 (Sept. 1998). Statewide
studies of incarceration in juvenile corrections facilities show that African-American
youth have the highest confinement rates. See id. "INlearly seven out of ten youth in
secure confinement are minority juveniles-a rate more than double their percentage
in the youth population." Patricia Devine et al., Disproportionate Minority
Confinement: Lessons Learned from Five States, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice), Dec. 1998, at 1.
4 See Allen J. Beck, Trends in U.S. Correctional Populations, in THE
DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS: CONTEMPORARY READINGS (M.C. Haas & G.P. Alpert eds.,
4th ed. 1999). This figure is derived from the following data:
Percentage of Men Under Correctional Supervision
by Race and Age, United States, 1996
Age Percent of white men Percent of black men
in age category in age category
18-19 4.4 16.2
20-24 8.0 29.4
25-29 7.1 28.9
30-34 5.8 24.4
34-39 4.4 17.2
40 or older 1.3 6.1
These figures pertain to all felons (and some misdemeanants), but the pattern
of gross overrepresentation of minorities in the criminal justice and correctional
systems predates the modern, highly punitive drug laws that many observers believe
have contributed to an excessive rate of incarceration of African-Americans for
nonviolent conduct. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 56-68, 104-16 (1995).
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From the standpoint of individual justice, it does not matter
that the nonwhites will be affected disproportionately-it is not
unfair to punish those who commit crimes. From the
perspective of comparative justice, however, it is problematic to
adopt a system that we know will fall more harshly on blacks
and other minorities.
A comprehensive DNA data base not only directly
satisfies the demand for comparative justice, but it could act as
a mild antidote to conscious or unconscious racial biases. DNA
evidence does not care about race. A data base profile either
does or does not match a crime scene sample. With a
population-wide data base, the identity of any matching
individual would be known-irrespective of race. When a
person is arrested and incriminating crime scene DNA
evidence points to another person whose DNA profile is in the
data base, prompt exoneration and release of the innocent is
likely to follow-no matter what the initial suspect's race or
status. If an innocent defendant does go to trial in such a case,
the crime scene DNA evidence and the results of the data base
search would be available, regardless of the defendant's race,
to raise reasonable doubt about guilt. There would be no need
to resort to racially focused or other forms of "DNA dragnets" of
entire neighborhoods65 and less chance for racial prejudices or
stereotypes to lead ordinary investigations astray.66
65 For accounts of police efforts to collect DNA samples from large numbers of
men in geographic locales to generate investigative leads, see Philip P. Pan, Pr.
George's Chief Has Used Serial Testing Before; Farrell Oversaw DNA Sampling of
2,300 in Fla., WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at B1 (reporting that the San Diego police
department "tested about 800 men during its search for a serial killer who stabbed six
women to death in their homes between January and September 1990 .... [Plolice
canvassed neighborhoods around the crime scenes and asked men matching a general
description of a dark-skinned male provided by a witness to voluntarily provide blood
or saliva samples.... The killer, a 23-year-old laborer named Cleophus Prince now on
death row, declined along with several other men to provide a sample. He later was
arrested for breaking into another woman's home and agreed to provide a DNA
sample-which matched evidence found at one of the murder scenes."); Alice Robinson,
DNA of Innocent Rape Suspects Will Not be Kept: Ann Arbor Resident Filed Civil
Lawsuit that Spurred Ruling, MICH. DAILY ONLINE (Nov. 21, 1997), at
http://www.pub.umich.edu/daily/1997/nov/11-21-97/news/newsl2.html (last visited Dec.
11, 1998) (reporting that in 1994, police in Ann Arbor investigating a series of rapes
collected blood samples from 160 African-American men in the area).
GG Rothstein and Carnahan point out that "lilt is not necessary to know the
identity of the perpetrator to exonerate an innocent person charged with the crime."
Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 165 n.218. The situation is more complex.
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Legal and Policy Issues dismisses this concern with
racial equality as "close to obfuscating."67  Expressing
indignation over "dragnet searches" of large numbers of
minority men (and women),68 the Article proposes, without a
shred of explanation, that "dragnet searches of minority
populations to generate suspects are unconstitutional under
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), and should be
prohibited." 9 'Without the outrage of such searches," Rothstein
and Carnahan write, 'Trofessor Kaye's 'equality' argument in
favor of a national databank collapses."7 ' Would that this were
so. Not only is this reading of Davis impossible, to support,71
Too many convicted offenders apparently exonerated by DNA testing have discovered
that nothing less than iron-clad proof of the identity of the actual offender will secure
their release. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Safe Intrusion, Al. LAW., June 11, 2001; Akhil
Reed Armar, Foreword: the Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 126
(2000). But even if one dismisses this problem as limited to the post-conviction phase
in which prosecutors and police are loathe to revise their thinking, a DNA-based
exoneration is not always possible. The sample size may be too limited to allow
complete typing, and the few loci that are typed may not suffice to exclude the innocent
suspect. In this situation, the database would expand the pool of identifiable suspects,
making a correct outcome much more likely. In other cases, the police may not put in
the effort required to collect a usable crime scene sample, especially when it is not
obvious that there is a sample to be found. In these situations, a population-wide DNA
database could be helpful because the very existence of such a powerful crime-solving
tool maximizes the incentive for police to obtain crime-scene DNA evidence. Finally,
and most important in terms of the analysis here, the population-wide database often
will enable the investigation to proceed in the right direction from the outset, reducing
the total number of people subjected to ordinary investigations-which are potentially
intrusive and, too often, unduly affected by racial considerations.
Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 165 n.218.
68 Id.
69 Id.
7 0 
Id.
71 In Davis, police in Meridian, Mississippi, questioned dozens of young blacks
in response to a rape that the victim said was committed by "a Negro youth." 394 U.S.
at 722. Their investigation of the home where the rape occurred revealed fingerprints
on and nearby the window. Id. Acting "without warrants, [they] took at least 24 Negro
youths to police headquarters where they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and
then released without charge." Id. One of these was a fourteen-year-old boy who they
later took, again without probable cause or a warrant, to a jail in Jackson, ninety miles
away. There, police took a second set of finger prints and confined him overnight. After
the FBI, which examined the boy's prints taken in Jackson as well as those of twenty-
three other suspects, reported that they matched the latent prints taken from the
window, Davis was indcted, tried, and convicted for the rape. Although Davis objected
at trial that the finger prints should be excluded as the product of an unlawful
detention, this evidence was admitted. Id. at 723. The Supreme Court reversed this
conviction.
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but the racial justice argument is much deeper and far more
disturbing. It is this: in this country at this time, any law
enforcement data base confined to convicted offenders (or other
people suspected of crimes) will be populated
disproportionately, and perhaps predominantly, by profiles
from minority groups. The reasons for the disparate effect may
be legitimate, or they may be nefarious, but this corrosive
At no point did anyone even question the fact that the police "dragnet" was
directed at young blacks. Nothing in Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority (or any
other opinion in the case) suggests that the Constitution prevents police from focusing
an investigation on individuals of one race once the evidence shows that criminal
conduct was committed by a person of that race. (For an analysis of the equal
protection implications of this standard police practice, see Edward J. Imwinkelried &
David H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413
(2001)).
The constitutional evil in Davis was quite different. It was the lack of a
warrant and individualized suspicion to detain the defendant and subject him to
custodial interrogation. It was not the process of fingerprinting per se that bothered
the Court. To the contrary, Justice Brennan suggested that probable cause might be
unnecessary because fingerprinting is not a significant invasion of privacy. 394 U.S. at
727. The solitary basis for the reversal was that "no attempt was made here to employ
procedures which might comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment: the
detention at police headquarters of petitioner and the other young Negroes was not
authorized by a judicial officer; petitioner was unnecessarily required to undergo two
fingerprinting sessions; and petitioner was not merely fingerprinted during the
December 3 detention but also subjected to interrogation." Id. at 728.
The mass DNA screens, whether they focus on African-Americans or any
other subpopulation, do not suffer from this infirmity. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prevents the police from approaching everyone in a community and asking
for their cooperation. The "dragnet" nature of the inquiry is no obstacle. Cf. United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no infirmity in issuing, without probable
cause, grand jury subpoenas to twenty men to secure voice exemplars from them). A
consensual contact between a police officer and a citizen is neither a search nor a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Cf Davis, 394 U.S. at 727 n.6 (1969) (referring
to "the settled principle that while the police have the right to request citizens to
answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel
them to answer"). As a legal matter, police may ask anyone and everyone to give DNA;
as long as they do not engage in coercion or misrepresentation, the police may collect
voluntary samples for analysis. Although one might wish to argue that police requests
for DNA are inherently coercive, the settled doctrine is that whether a particular
contact involves coercion or misrepresentation is a matter of fact to be determined
under the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973).
The upshot of this standard analysis is that one would be sorely and sadly
mistaken to rely on Davis for protection against police asking individuals of a single
race or of many races to provide a DNA samples. In contrast, a population-wide data
base would remove the incentive for police who are stymied in their efforts to solve
serial killings or rapes to resort to neighborhood-wide or race-specific mass DNA
screenings.
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outcome is assuredly not the result of recent and infrequent
DNA "dragnets."
It is not obfuscating, but vital, to recognize that privacy
and equality are deeply intertwined considerations in devising
structural rules for law enforcement data bases. No set of rules
should be formulated without attending to the equality strand
along with the privacy issues. Of course, when all is said and
done, the policy prescriptions of Legal and Policy Issues might
be exactly right. It may be that the privacy concerns are so
substantial and the equality concerns so flimsy that only the
identifying profiles of violent felons should be included in law
enforcement data bases. However, Rothstein and Carnahan do
not demonstrate this point, for they confuse the desire for
anonymity with more deserving facets of privacy, and they
largely ignore the racial disparities implicit in an offender-only
data base.
III. THE IMPACT OF EDMOND AND FERGUSON
In addition to promulgating public policy
pronouncements, Rothstein and Carnahan skillfully dissect the
case law on the constitutionality of law enforcement DNA data
bases. Here, their conclusions are more circumspect. They
cautiously write that "the outcome of a court challenge to a
broader data bank law must be viewed as unclear at this
time,"72 but "it is possible that [expanded data banking] might
be held constitutional"73 by the Supreme Court. Their summary
of the case law is generally accurate and perceptive,74 and it
raises a perplexing question: how can any law enforcement
DNA data bank be deemed constitutional in the wake of the
Supreme Court's recent opinions in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond" and Ferguson v. City of Charleston?6
Before the last Term, the Supreme Court had applied
the "special needs" doctrine to a wide variety of government
programs, from municipal housing inspections, to inspections
72Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 130.
M Id.
7 However, there are opportunities for quibbling. See, e.g., infra note 96.
75 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
7G 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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of motor vehicles at border checkpoints, to random drug testing
of employees.77 In these cases, the Court reasoned that "neither
a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of
individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance."7 8 Rather, as the Court
explained the exception in National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab:79
[Olur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context.
8 0
Many courts invoked this somewhat ill-defined doctrine to
uphold the data base statutes requiring convicted offenders to
provide DNA samples."
As Rothstein and Carnahan demonstrate, however,
Edmond and Ferguson confine the special needs doctrine to
programs of searches and seizures adopted for a primary
purpose other than catching or deterring offenders, effectively
pulling the rug out from under the earlier data base cases. In
Edmond, the Court declined to apply the special needs
exception to a program in which police used dogs to sniff for
drugs in vehicles pulled over in groups at fixed roadblocks.
Distinguishing sharply between "highway safety interests and
the general interest in crime control,"82 the majority reasoned
that "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the Indianapolis
narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the
Fourth Amendment."83 Likewise, in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston," the Court invalidated a program in which a state
university hospital tested urine samples from pregnant women
7 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 10.
78 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 665-66.
1 See Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 138.
"Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 41-42.
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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for cocaine and reported positive results to the police so that
those women, fearing prosecution, would be induced to
participate in substance abuse counseling offered as an
alternative to criminal prosecution. Again, the majority of the
Court emphasized "the relevant primary purpose"-which was
said to be "the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing
mothers."5
It does not follow, however, that "crime control and
investigation [are] now an unconstitutional 'primary purpose'
under Edmond and Ferguson."86 The police power to provide for
public security and the general welfare remains a legitimate
constitutional power of government. In the aftermath of
Edmond and Ferguson, three arguments might be adduced to
justify the exercise of this power to construct and operate DNA
data bases."
A. The Flanking Maneuver: Subsequent Use Is Not A
Search
One argumentative strategy is an end run around the
warrant requirement that proceeds in two giant steps. The first
step is to justify the acquisition of the DNA samples by relying
on the "true identity exception."88 This exception allows police
to acquire a record of a physical feature that identifies a
person. Any biometric identifier-photographing, finger-
printing, DNA typing-any process that painlessly records
purely physical features that help to establish the true identity
of a person who might be using an alias-falls within this
exception. If the person is legitimately detained (as in a valid
custodial arrest), police can acquire the biometric identifier so
they know who they are detaining and who might be
apprehended again in an escape or a subsequent encounter. 9
Id. at 74 (citation omitted).
Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 155.
Such arguments are developed at greater length in Kaye, supra note 10.
"Id.
"See 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(c) (3d ed. 1996) ("Fingerprinting, as a routine part of the
booking process, is justified by the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for
an absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing whether he is
wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in the event he flees prosecution,
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This is the principle that underlies the early cases on
photographing and fingerprinting arrestees. °
This "true identity exception" is subtly different from
"the identification exception"9 described by Rothstein and
Carnahan. According to Rothstein and Carnahan, "fingerprints
or photographs" are "non-invasive administrative means of
identification" that simply do not "implicate the Fourth
Amendment"92 and that appropriately advance "the state's
interest in preserving a permanent identification record of
convicted offenders to resolve past and future crimes."" While
the degree of the intrusion certainly is a consideration, the
initial cases holding photography and fingerprinting
constitutional did not reason that these procedures were not
searches. Rather, they stated that these identification
procedures were reasonable interferences with personal liberty
or privacy.' Moreover, the original true identity exception did
not contemplate using the biometric data to link individuals to
find the perpetrators of unsolved crimes.95 The exception was
simply a response to the need for a reliable means of
determining the criminal history of arrestees.
Thus, the true identity exception, as established before
the DNA data base cases of the 1990s, does not justify the
creation and use of a data base. That requires the second step.
The argument here is that once the police have a program in
place whose primary purpose is the administrative one of
maintaining.a record of an individual's true identity, they can
make a secondary use of the record to investigate unsolved
crimes.96 They can show a witness mug shots or search a data
but there is no need for the government to establish any of these needs on a
case-by-case basis.").90 See Kaye, supra note 10 (collecting these cases).
91 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 144, 155.
92 Id. at 155.
Id. at 146 (describing "the identification exception" as articulated in
Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1092 (Mass. 1999)).
See Kaye, supra note 10.
95 Id.
90 Although it does not affect this second step in the flanking maneuver,
it is worth commenting on Rothstein and Carnahan's claim that "the Supreme Court
has recognized that a laboratory analysis of blood and other bodily fluids constitutes a
'second search' subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement." Legal
and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 156-57. They find this recognition in Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives'Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Id. at 157 n.190. But Skinner does not go
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base of fingerprints or DNA profiles in the hope of generating
investigative leads. These are not new searches. They are uses
of legitimately acquired records that do not infringe on the
interests of an individual-other than the obvious one of not
being caught or suspected of the crime."
However, in light of Edmond and Ferguson, it is crucial
to the flanking maneuver that ascertaining an individual's true
identity is the primary purpose and that trawling the data
base for investigative leads is secondary. For DNA data bases,
this claim is likely to be extremely implausible. The legislative
interest in DNA data bases has not been primarily to
supplement or supplant fingerprints as markers of true
identity; it has always been to generate investigative leads.
B. The Frontal Assault: Edmond and Ferguson Are
Wrongly Decided
A second response to Edmond and Ferguson would be to
question the primary purpose test established in these
this far. The majority there did not write that the laboratory analysis of a urine sample
was, in itself, a search. It discerned a search in light of the invasion of informational
privacy arising from the laboratory analysis only when combined with the
intrusiveness of obtaining the urine sample. The Court emphasized that "tihere are
few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most
people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function
traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (quoting
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)). On
this basis, and not because the laboratory work standing alone was a search, the Court
concluded: "Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal
Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions
must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
Perhaps the Cours language was meant to assert that taken separately, "collection
and testing" each constitute a search, but this is not clear from the text or structure of
the majority opinion. The Skinner Court was not confronted with the question of
whether a laboratory analysis of a legitimately acquired sample is a "second search,"
and lower courts have concluded that it is not. See Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
97 Conceivably, Rothstein and Carnahan mean to capture this two-step
reasoning in their references to an undifferentiated "identification exception."
However, it is not clear that the second step is consistent with the theory in Harold J.
Kent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74
TEx. L. REV. 49 (1995), on which they rely. See Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12,
at 157 n.191.
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opinions. In constitutional law, the analysis of legislative
motivation is a perennially vexing problem, and today's
majority view could become tomorrow's dissent.98 The only
coherent rationale for the special needs exception is that the
usual balance of individual and government interests, which
results in a per se rule against warrantless searches (riddled
with categorical exceptions), does not apply when the usual
government interest in law enforcement is reinforced by special
needs.99 As such, it can be argued that the special need to
maintain a record of the true identity of individuals who are
detained by the police arguably transports the situation
outside the realm of the per se rule and justifies the type of
balancing permitted under the special needs exception. If
accepted, this line of argument might justify carefully
constructed programs of compulsory DNA sampling on arrest,
but aspects of a population-wide data base would remain
constitutionally problematic.'0
C. The Solution: A New Biometric Identification Exception
The flanking maneuver works in theory, but fails in
practice. The frontal assault requires the Court to reconsider
its two most recent encounters with the special needs
exception, and that is not an especially likely prospect. The
result, it seems, is that all law enforcement DNA data bases
are unconstitutional regardless of how minimally invasive or
intrusive they are and how much they contribute to the
enforcement of the criminal law. To escape from this dilemma,
a third response to Edmond and Ferguson should be
considered. Rather than attempting an end run or trying to
force DNA sampling into the special needs mold, it is time to
harmonize the early line of cases on fingerprinting and
photographing detainees with the modern cases on DNA data
banking by crafting a new biometric identification exception.
98 Both cases were decided by six-to-three margins.
99 See Kaye, supra note 10.
'00 Because the primary purpose of taking DNA from newborns is to identify
treatable genetic conditions such as phenylketonuria ("PKU"), and not to solve crimes,
a population-wide database built prospectively from these samples might not run afoul
of Edmonds and Ferguson. See David H. Kaye et al., Is a Population-Wide DNA
Identification Database in Our Future?, - CRIM. J. BULL. - (forthcoming 2001).
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DNA data bases can do much more than discern an
individual's true identity. They can associate individuals with
crimes. A cogent argument can be made for a new exception to
the warrant requirement for the relatively nonintrusive
collection of nonstigmatizing, personally identifying markers
that can generate a list of probable perpetrators of serious
crimes. The Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment
permits such an exception-depending on the balance between
the nature and extent of the infringement of the individual's
privacy on the one hand, and the value of having a data base of
genotypes on the other. Elsewhere, I have begun to describe
this balancing as it applies to arrestees'o and members of the
larger public."2 The outcome of the balancing surely is
debatable, and it will turn, among other things, on the privacy
protections incorporated in each statute. But addressing the
direct question of whether there should be a new exception to
warrant and probable cause requirements will provide the
most satisfactory approach to resolving the tension between
the Court's two latest special needs cases and the last decade's
worth of DNA data base cases.
CONCLUSION
The choices made in designing law enforcement data
bases will have major repercussions on public safety, privacy,
and equality. Not all aspects of "the freedom to be left alone,""0 3
or even "the freedom to be left alone from governmental
demands for bodily specimens""4 are equally momentous.
Limiting data bases to profiles of those who have been
convicted of violent felonies privileges a form of privacy of
relatively little value. At the same time, this coverage would
surely perpetuate a system of racially skewed data bases and
greatly curtail the capacity of this identification technology to
prevent widespread, major crimes. Counteracting important
threats to fundamental privacy interests would justify such a
1
' See Kaye, supra note 10.
102 See Kaye & Smith, supra note 17.
'3 Legal and Policy Issues, supra note 12, at 167.
04 Id.
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policy choice, but the dangers posed by properly constructed
and administered identification data bases do not.
Paradoxically, a carefully constructed and administered
population-wide data base may offer the greatest privacy
protection for all of us. Such a system need not involve the
police or the criminal justice system to determine whose
samples are collected and to acquire, analyze, and store the
vast bulk of those samples. Furthermore, including every
citizen's profile avoids the public attitude that the system is for
"them," not "us," and hence that abuses will affect only
criminals, not the rest of us. As a result, it would force the
legislative and executive branches to take the greatest care in
fashioning and implementing the system so as to protect
privacy.
Even so, it may be tempting to dismiss a population-
wide data base as impracticable, politically impossible, or
unconstitutional. I believe that these judgments are
premature, but even if they are correct, it could be equally
ineffectual to insist that existing data bases be confined to a
small subset of offenders. Given the enormous momentum of
the movement to expand data base coverage at least with
regard to categories of convicted offenders, it would be
politically astute to focus reform efforts on the other matters
raised in Legal and Policy Issues and in this commentary. Who
should have access to the data bases and the samples from
which they are derived? For what purposes? Should the
samples and the data be retained indefinitely? Should the
samples be retained at all? Should the profiles of past offenders
be available for any use other than to check against crime-
scene samples? What constraints should be codified in statutes
as opposed to regulation? As Legal and-Policy Issues reminds
us, there is ample room to improve the content and drafting of
many DNA data base statutes.
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